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The idea of introducing a monetary remedy for harm arising out of 
the misdirected exercise of public power has waxed and waned in 
popularity in Australia over the years. Though few would dispute 
the intuitive appeal of the sentiment that wrongs should not go 
unremedied, the question of how harm arising from 
maladministration could, or should, be repaired remains 
unresolved. This article canvasses a number of the potential 
justifications for the creation of such a remedy, before noting the 
various avenues the Australian courts have considered, and closed 
down, which might otherwise have led in that direction. These 
rejected opportunities have included the expansion of existing tort 
actions, the creation of new causes of action in tort, and the 
interpretation of statutory remedial powers. Whatever the merit of a 
remedy on this front, it is clear that it will need to be a matter of 
legislative, rather than judicial, intervention. 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years have passed since Michael Fordham urged that the time was 
coming to ‘grasp [the] nettle’ and broach the vexed topic of reparation for 
maladministration, which he described as ‘public law’s final frontier’.1 The 
intervening period has seen a waxing and waning of academic interest in the 
topic, as well as lukewarm enthusiasm for embarking upon law reform. However, 
in 2018, it seems that we are little closer to addressing the root concerns that 
have plagued proponents of a public law remedy in damages for decades. With 
the debate now at risk of going stale for want of legislative attention,2 our aim is 
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1  Michael Fordham, ‘Reparation for Maladministration: Public Law's Final Frontier’ (2003) 8 Judicial 
Review 104, 108. 
2  This is not the only example of legislative inattention effectively ending public law reform; the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) has long been neglected in the face of calls for 
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to provoke fresh consideration of the topic by outlining a number of the 
theoretical justifications that might underpin the introduction of such a remedy, 
and testing a number of the key arguments that have been raised against such a 
proposal. 
This article sets the parameters in which a revitalised debate might occur by 
introducing a number of the justifications that will continue to underlie calls to 
provide a monetary remedy in public law. Moving beyond the intuitive appeal 
underlying the claim that for every wrong there must be a remedy, other possible 
justifications for the introduction of public law damages include: historical 
precedent; the theory of equality before public burdens; or the concept of 
accountability. We do not take sides on the issue of whether the introduction of a 
monetary remedy in public law is necessary or desirable. Rather, this article 
outlines these arguments with a view to encouraging later principled exploration 
of the barriers that might prevent that development. Whatever the strengths of the 
case in favour of an administrative law damages remedy, we regard it as clear 
that any movement on this front will be instigated legislatively, rather than 
judicially, because the Australian courts have already closed down a range of 
avenues that might have led to the creation of a monetary remedy for invalid 
administrative action. 
Ultimately, this article aims to provide the impetus for future exploration of 
the various impediments that have been thrown in the path of developing a 
monetary remedy in public law. As highlighted in our concluding comments, 
proposals for reform that have been floated over the years have been challenged 
on a range of bases. Some of these concerns are pragmatic in nature (for 
example, claims that there might be overkill and impacts on public resourcing), 
while others are based in principle (for example, claims that public law damages 
would produce incoherence in the law and interfere with the separation of 
powers). If there is any merit in the idea of remedying harm caused by 
maladministration with damages, then these are the prickly nettles that must 
eventually be grasped. We leave the detail of addressing such a task to another 
article. 
 
II   A MISSING REMEDY? 
A useful starting point in this topic is to think about what omission in 
existing remedial mechanisms drives the reformist enthusiasm of the proponents 
of a public law damages remedy. What role would it play that is not otherwise 
addressed? To understand the nature of the alleged gap in the public law 
remedies, it is useful to look at the existing legal landscape into which a damages 
remedy would fit. This article does not propose to offer a comprehensive 
overview of the various means by which the government can be held liable for its 
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decisions, acts and omissions.3 For present purposes, the more important task is 
to map out the juncture between illegality (ie, where the government has acted in 
excess of its powers) and liability (ie, where the government can be required to 
compensate an individual harmed as a result of its illegal act). In this respect, we 
have developed a taxonomy which considers the four different dynamics at play.  
First, a finding of illegality may remove a defence which is otherwise 
available (‘Type 1’). Secondly, the presence of illegality may operate as a 
threshold enquiry, making it an essential (but not determinative) ingredient in 
assessing liability (‘Type 2’). Thirdly, public law illegality may be a natural 
corollary of a finding of liability under another regime, even though the courts do 
not undertake any analysis of whether the conduct contravened a public law 
ground of review (‘Type 3’). Finally, there are some circumstances in which a 
finding of public law illegality is entirely irrelevant to liability in an alternative 
regime. The conduct may be invalid without giving rise to liability, or may give 
rise to liability without being invalid (‘Type 4’). In looking at the range of 
mechanisms that are most frequently pointed to as a source of compensation for 
an individual harmed by the government, we can identify expressions of each of 
these types of dynamics. Importantly, however, none of these types of dynamics 
provides a damages remedy for excess of power per se; it is for this reason that 
we can regard monetary remedies as missing from the public law arena. 
The trespass categories of torts fall most squarely within Type 1, as the 
question of whether or not an official has acted within the scope of their powers 
determines whether or not they are able to rely on a defence of legal authority. 
For example, an official who makes an arrest may rely on the legality of their 
conduct (such as acting on the basis of a valid arrest warrant) to defend a claim 
that might otherwise be made in the torts of trespass or battery. Similarly, an 
official who detains an individual may rely on the legality of their conduct (such 
as a properly formed reasonable suspicion that the individual is a non-citizen)4 to 
defend a claim made pursuant to the tort of false imprisonment. Perhaps the most 
difficult aspect of such claims is determining the scope of liability where the 
source of legal authority relied on (for example, a warrant) is later discovered to 
have been created ultra vires. Does the subsequent invalidation of that legal 
authority expose the frontline official who gives effect to the order, and/or the 
party who initially made the order,5 to liability? The crux of the issue was well 
captured by Simon Brown LJ in Percy v Hall as follows: 
                                                            
3  That broader question has been well canvassed elsewhere. Relevant considerations include: the scope of 
governmental immunities, liability for regulatory functions and omissions, distinctions between direct 
and vicarious liability and the like. See, eg, Mark Aronson, Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks, Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2017) ch 19; Greg 
Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities: Remedies and Reform (Hart Publishing, 2016) ch 8. 
4  As was the case for immigration detention officers in Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612. 
5  As to the potential liability of the author of an invalid instrument, see Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 
NSWLR 269, 274–7 (Spigelman CJ), reversed on appeal in Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612. Mr 
Taylor successfully argued at first instance and on appeal that the Minister, his delegate and immigration 
officers were liable for false imprisonment in circumstances where the detention scheme was effectively 
‘self-executing’ and detention was the ‘inevitable consequence’ of the Minister’s decision: (2003) 58 
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It seems to me one thing to accept, as readily I do, that a subsequent declaration as 
to [the by-laws’] invalidity operates retrospectively to entitle a person convicted 
of their breach to have that conviction set aside; quite another to hold that it 
transforms what, judged at the time, was to be regarded as the lawful discharge of 
the constables’ duty into what must later be found actionably tortious conduct.6 
In part, the complexity in this area can be traced to historical difficulties of 
characterising the practical and legal results that flow from a finding that a 
decision or instrument was made ultra vires.7 While an officer may in some cases 
be entitled to exercise powers in an otherwise tortious manner on the basis that 
their ‘reasonable suspicion’ of certain facts causes such acts to be performed 
validly,8 there may be a limit to the reach of this protection. McHugh J 
considered one such potential limit in Coleman v Power,9 in which the High 
Court was asked to determine the constitutional validity of legislation creating an 
offence of using insulting words in a public place, and in turn the validity of Mr 
Coleman’s arrest. In the minority on the question of the legislation’s validity,10 
McHugh J observed that because constitutionally invalid legislation is void ab 
initio, it could not form the basis of a defence of statutory authority: ‘a person 
cannot intend to execute a statutory instrument if the instrument does not exist’.11 
His Honour went on to explain that ‘[t]o seek to validate an arrest made in 
respect of an offence that is invalid under the Constitution is as offensive to the 
Constitution, as the law that purported to create the offence’.12 Accordingly, the 
question of liability for these categories of torts might be classified as Type 1, 
but this also depends to some extent on proper characterisation of the relevant 
type of illegality and interpretation of the applicable statutory scheme. 
                                                                                                                                                   
NSWLR 269, 274, 277 (Spigelman CJ approving the comments of the trial judge). A majority of the 
High Court held that there was no direct link between the conduct of the Minister and Mr Taylor’s 
imprisonment, because immigration officers detained on the basis of their own ‘reasonable suspicion’ of 
Mr Taylor’s status: (2005) 222 CLR 612, 622 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). Such a 
limitation on the exercise of statutory powers (which in fact had the status of a duty in that case) is well 
understood: see George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104. Even if Mr Ruddock had adopted the putative 
tort after its commission, or ordered it beforehand, the reasonable suspicion premise would have excused 
him as well as the delegate and detaining officers. 
6  [1997] QB 924, 947–8. 
7  A good example of this difficulty can be observed in relation to decisions of superior courts in excess of 
power. In New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118, 133 [32], French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, 
Bell and Keane JJ noted that: 
It is now firmly established by the decisions of this Court that the orders of a federal court which is 
established as a superior court of record are valid until set aside, even if the orders are made in excess of 
jurisdiction (whether on constitutional grounds or for reasons of some statutory limitation on jurisdiction). 
 See also R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans [No 2] [2001] 2 AC 19, 26 (Lord Slynn). It is 
also necessary to bear in mind the scope of judicial immunity insofar as the invalid instrument was 
authored by a judicial officer: Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118. 
8  See, eg, Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 62 [137] (McHugh J). 
9  (2004) 220 CLR 1. 
10  A majority found that section 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) did 
not unduly burden the implied freedom of political communication: ibid 78 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
11  Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 62 [140] (McHugh J). Kirby J in the same case thought that this 
principle would be limited to cases of constitutional invalidity: at 101. 
12  Ibid 63 [143] (McHugh J). 
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The tort of misfeasance in public office is an additional means by which 
citizens can access compensation from government. Though there remains some 
debate about the scope of the tort,13 the view expressed by Lord Millet in Three 
Rivers District Council v Bank of England [No 3]14 was that the tort could be 
made out in cases of ‘targeted malice’ (in which case it was unnecessary to 
demonstrate that the official had acted in excess of their powers), or alternatively, 
in cases where an official had knowingly or recklessly exceeded their powers 
with foresight of harm to the plaintiff.15 The latter form of the tort involves Type 
2 public law illegality, where illegality operates as an essential ingredient 
(though not determinant) of liability.16 In relation to the ‘targeted malice’ form of 
the tort,17 the plaintiff does not need to demonstrate unlawfulness, and this type 
of claim therefore falls outside the scope of Type 2. Instead, this form of the tort 
is Type 3, where public law illegality is not an element of the claim, but where a 
finding of tortious liability necessarily implies that the official has nonetheless 
acted in excess of power. This is because any ‘malicious’ conduct for the purpose 
of this arm of the tort would of its nature contravene the judicial review grounds 
of improper purpose and likely also bad faith.18 
One of the most well-known means of accessing compensation from the 
government is the tort of negligence. This particular tort has a complex history in 
respect of its interaction with public law illegality. At various times, public law 
illegality has played roles involving each of Types 1 to 4, with movements to 
incorporate and then disentangle public law principles from the assessment of 
liability. In England, Geddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir was an early 
authority standing for the proposition that a public body could be liable in 
negligence for conduct that was otherwise within power.19 In other words, 
negligence removed an otherwise available defence of statutory authority, being 
                                                            
13  And even greater doubt as to how a statutory damages scheme might address this tort. We leave that issue 
to another day. 
14  [2003] 2 AC 1. 
15  Ibid 235–6. 
16  See Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 356 (Brennan J) (‘Mengel’). The Full Federal 
Court has rejected the argument that spite or an intention to harm would be insufficient to found liability 
if the officer’s action is otherwise lawful: Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (2017) 248 FCR 311, 329–30 
[87] (North and Rares JJ). Their Honours were referring to Mark Aronson, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office: 
Some Unfinished Business’ (2016) 132 Law Quarterly Review 427, 441. 
17  Lord Sumption remarked in Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) 
Ltd [2014] AC 366, 416–17 (‘Crawford Adjusters’) that the requirement to establish targeted malice in 
cases where misfeasance in public office is alleged makes it, and other malice-based torts such as 
malicious prosecution, amongst the very limited exceptions to the general rule that malice is irrelevant to 
tort liability; see Corporation of Bradford v Pickles [1895] 1 Ch 145. More generally, his Lordship gives 
accurate expression to the chaotic development of the tort of malicious prosecution, an evolution which 
has continued until so recently that the United Kingdom (‘UK’) Supreme Court was forced to revist the 
Privy Council’s decision in Crawford Adjusters as a nine member court in Willers v Joyce [2016] 3 WLR 
477. 
18  The only circumstances in which this would not be the case would be in relation to a power specifically 
conferred to enable an official to act maliciously; it is inconceivable that the legislature would enact such 
a law. See Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (2017) 248 FCR 311, 330 [88] (North and Rares JJ).  
19  (1878) 3 App Cas 430, 456 (Lord Blackburn). 
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a Type 1 cause of action. This principle was revisited in Home Office v Dorset 
Yacht Co Ltd,20 in which members of the House of Lords drew a distinction 
between liability for the performance of duties and the exercise of discretionary 
powers.21 The former remained within our Type 1, while the latter became Type 
2; liability could only attach if the official’s conduct fell outside the legal ambit 
of their discretion.22  
The notion of public law invalidity as a threshold liability issue in the 
exercise of discretionary powers (that is, a Type 2 claim) survived until the 
decision of X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council.23 In that case, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson was critical of the employment of public law concepts in 
private law, an approach he described as neither ‘helpful [n]or necessary’.24 
However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson then paradoxically25 proposed the 
incorporation of the Wednesbury test of unreasonableness as a determinant of 
liability in negligence.26 This may have maintained a Type 2 approach, under 
which Wednesbury unreasonableness would operate as a threshold justiciability 
issue, or may have perhaps represented a move to Type 3, in which Wednesbury 
would operate not as a threshold question, but as a standard of care affecting 
assessment of breach of duty. In Stovin v Wise,27 Lord Hoffmann adopted the 
Type 2 approach in introducing a further layer into the enquiry in the form of the 
distinction between acts and omissions, seemingly requiring that the failure to 
exercise a power be ‘irrational’ before liability in negligence might attach.28 
Since Stovin, further cases have alternately asserted and denied the relevance of 
public law illegality in the context of government liability in negligence, though 
the balance appears to favour removal of public law tests as a threshold 
enquiry.29  
In Australia, the position prior to the turn of the century was less complex 
than that in England. Although Brennan CJ favoured the incorporation of public 
law concepts of illegality into government liability in negligence,30 that approach 
was decisively rejected by a majority in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry 
Finance Committee.31 This case established that government liability in 
negligence fell into our Type 4: ‘the negligent exercise of a statutory power is not 
                                                            
20  [1970] AC 1004. 
21  Ibid 1031 (Lord Reid), 1067–8 (Lord Diplock). 
22  Ibid. 
23  [1995] 2 AC 633. 
24  Ibid 736. 
25  Duncan Fairgrieve, State Liability in Tort: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 2003) 43. 
26  X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 736. 
27  [1996] AC 923 (‘Stovin’). 
28  Ibid 953. 
29  See, eg, Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550; Phelps v Hillingdon London 
Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619; Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 All 
ER 326. 
30  Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 346; Romeo v Conservation Commission of the 
Northern Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431, 443. 
31  (1999) 200 CLR 1, 35 (McHugh J), 13 (Gleeson CJ agreeing with McHugh J), 78–9 (Kirby J). 
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immune from liability simply because it was within power, nor is it actionable in 
negligence simply because it is ultra vires’.32 
Instead of relying on public law concepts, the Australian courts subsumed 
concerns relating to the status of government defendants into the ordinary 
principles of negligence, rather than dealing with them as stand-alone tests of 
liability.33 The apparent resolution of this debate was thrown again into 
uncertainty with the introduction of civil liability legislation in a number of 
Australian States. For example, in NSW, section 43A of the Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) introduced the language of Wednesbury unreasonableness into the 
assessment of government liability for the exercise of ‘special statutory powers’. 
Initial suggestions were that this would introduce what we describe as a Type 2 
public law illegality enquiry into the Australian law, pursuant to which 
Wednesbury unreasonableness would operate as a precondition to liability.34 The 
better view (and that which appears to have been adopted by the courts)35 is that 
the section instead represents an adjustment to the applicable standard of care, 
being a Type 3 claim in which the high degree of unreasonableness required to 
establish negligence liability would, by its nature, also render the decision invalid 
at public law.  
Beyond the law of tort, compensation may also be available from the 
government pursuant to the law of restitution, which may be relevant in cases 
where an individual has made a payment to the government which the 
government was not entitled to receive. Under Australian law, restitution may be 
available where a defendant has been unjustly enriched due to a mistake of fact 
or law36 (which does not assist a plaintiff who correctly believes the demand for 
payment to have been invalid),37 or where the government has exercised a degree 
of compulsion38 (which requires something more than mere invalidity).39 These 
                                                            
32  Ibid 35 [82] (McHugh J). 
33  Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 394 (Kirby J). 
34  See, eg, Grant Scott Watson, ‘Section 43A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW): Public Law Styled 
Immunity for the Negligence of Public and Other Authorities?’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 153. 
35  See, eg, Collins v Clarence Valley Council [No 3] [2013] NSWSC 1682, [100] (Beech-Jones J); Curtis v 
Harden Shire Council (2014) 88 NSWLR 10, 71 [272] (Basten JA). 
36  The High Court rejected the previous distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law in David 
Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353, 376–9 (Mason CJ, Deane, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). It was later removed as a bar to restitution by the House of Lords in 
Kleinwort Benson Limited v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349. However, allowing restitution for 
mistake of law has created new issues, not least the problems that arise where a valid payment becomes 
retroactively invalid: James Edelman and Elise Bant, Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, 2nd ed, 2016) 
186.   
37  Before the bar to restitution for mistake of law was lifted in the UK, this was the very difficulty which 
faced the plaintiff in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 
70 (‘Woolwich’). 
38  For example, demands made colore officii (under colour of office): Sargood Bros v Commonwealth 
(1910) 11 CLR 258, 301 (Isaacs J). Before the development of administrative law as we currently 
understand it, the colore officii cases (eg, Dew v Parsons (1819) 2 B & Ald 562; Morgan v Palmer 
(1824) 2 B&C 729; Steele v Williams (1853) 8 Exch 625) ‘firmly controlled … one species of ultra vires 
behaviour’, being enrichment consequent on making an ultra vires demand: Peter Birks, ‘Restitution from 
the Executive: A Tercentenary Footnote to the Bill of Rights’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution 
(Law Book, 1990) 164, 178. 
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forms of restitution claim are of Type 2, as demonstrating excess of power is a 
necessary ingredient of the claim. Importantly, restitution in Australia is not yet 
available based on invalidity per se. It is in the United Kingdom, in the form of 
the Woolwich principle.40 Although, given the silence of the High Court on the 
matter, Australian plaintiffs must still work on the assumption that they are 
required to show something more than mere invalidity in order to obtain 
restitution, the likelihood41 that Woolwich will be adopted in Australia has been 
discussed both in the Federal Court and various academic publications.42 Little 
stands in its way but the right case reaching the High Court. 
Certain non-judicial mechanisms might also operate to provide an individual 
harmed by the government with access to compensation. One of the more widely 
recognised examples of such a mechanism is ex gratia compensation, which is 
made available in Australian jurisdictions under a variety of statutory and 
executive schemes.43 These, and related schemes for waiver of debts and the 
like,44 are inherently discretionary in nature45 and expressly do not require public 
law illegality (therefore comprising Type 4). In fact, payments made pursuant to 
the two Commonwealth schemes (being the Compensation for Detriment Caused 
by Defective Administration Scheme and act of grace payments under section 65 
of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)) each 
presuppose that an applicant is not otherwise entitled to restoration from some 
other source.46 In this respect, any question of access to compensation via these 
mechanisms is independent of the question of invalidity in a public law sense.47 
                                                                                                                                                   
39  See, eg, Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108, 142 (Windeyer J). 
40  Woolwich [1993] AC 70. 
41  Australia’s adoption of Woolwich has at times been assumed already to have occurred; see Simone 
Degeling, ‘Restitution of Unlawfully Exacted Tax in Australia: The Woolwich Principle’ in Steven 
Elliott, Birke Häcker and Charles Mitchell (eds), Restitution of Overpaid Tax (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
313, 314. 
42  See the references cited in Keith Mason, J W Carter and G J Tolhurst, Mason and Carter’s Restitution 
Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2016) 794 [2021]. 
43  Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) s 65 (‘PGPA Act’); Commonwealth 
Department of Finance, ‘Scheme for Compensation for Detriment Caused by Defective Administration’ 
(Resource Management Guide No 409, 2017) (‘CDDA Scheme Guide’); New South Wales Treasury, 
‘Ex Gratia Payments’ (Treasury Circular No TC11/02, 1 February 2011); Financial Accountability Act 
2009 (Qld) ss 65, 72; South Australia Department of Treasury and Finance, ‘Ex Gratia Payments’ 
(Treasurer’s Instruction No 14, 21 January 2015); Victoria State Government, ‘Disclosure of Ex Gratia 
Expenses’ (Financial Reporting Direction No 11A, June 2013); Financial Management Act 1996 (ACT) 
s 130; Financial Management Act 1995 (NT) s 37; Financial Management Act 2006 (WA) s 80. 
Tasmania does not have generally applicable statutory provisions for making ex gratia payments or 
waiving debts, but see the Financial Management and Audit Act 1990 (Tas) ss 13–14. 
44  See, eg, Commonwealth Department of Finance, ‘Requests for Discretionary Financial Assistance under 
the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013’ (Resource Management Guide 
No 401, April 2018) pts 2–3 (‘PGPA Act Discretionary Remedies Guide’). 
45  It tends for this reason to be of great practical benefit when an ombudsman recommends that a payment 
be made under a discretionary compensation scheme: Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities, above n 3, 
252–3. 
46  The CDDA Scheme is not intended to operate in circumstances where the Commonwealth can reasonably 
be expected to be found liable in litigation or where other avenues of remedy exist: CDDA Scheme 
Guide, above n 43, 7 [19], [23]. Likewise, an act of grace payment is to be regarded as ‘a remedy of last 
resort’, requiring that all other remedial avenues have been exhausted. Legal review mechanisms must be 
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What we can take from this discussion is that public law illegality is not 
determinative of the availability of remedies pursuant to the various judicial and 
executive mechanisms that we commonly think of as providing a remedy for 
harm caused by the government. The closest that we come to such a position is 
the tort of breach of statutory duty, which provides a remedy for harm suffered 
following breach of a legislative obligation. However, for the reasons discussed 
below,48 this tort has come to be of little practical relevance in this context. 
Instead, what we see is a series of mechanisms that interact with principles of 
public law illegality in different ways, but without reaching the position that a 
remedy is available for loss occasioned as a result of invalidity per se. This is the 
remedial gap that is under investigation. 
 
III   THE ALLURE OF PUBLIC LAW DAMAGES 
The inherent appeal underlying the case in favour of extending the reach of 
compensatory damages to invalid administrative action is summed up in Lord 
Bingham’s much quoted dictum: ‘it would require very potent considerations of 
public policy … to override the rule of public policy which has first claim on the 
loyalty of the law: that wrongs should be remedied’.49 
To similar effect was Denning LJ’s entreaty: ‘I should be sorry to think that, 
if a wrong has been done, the plaintiff is to go without a remedy simply because 
no one can find a peg to hang it on’.50  
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of these ideas, there is a large leap from 
this intuition to the creation of a remedy in damages for invalid administrative 
action. The following discussion sets out some of the grounds which might 
justify the expansion of public law remedies to provide for compensation: 
historical precedent, the theories of equality and risk, and the concept of 
accountability. 
 
A   An Historical Mandate 
One reason to think seriously about a potential role for damages in the 
context of public law wrongs is that it is an approach underwritten by an 
historical legacy. Before administrative law as we now know it had developed, 
damages awards in tort actions brought by individual citizens were the primary 
means of rendering government actors accountable for conduct in excess of 
                                                                                                                                                   
used where a person claims a decision was legally incorrect: PGPA Act Discretionary Remedies Guide, 
above n 44, 5–6 [3]–[6]. 
47  Additionally, individual Australian jurisdictions have discretionary compensation schemes directed to 
specific categories of loss, such as: injuries suffered by victims of crime; institutional sexual abuse; and 
various categories of loss suffered exclusively or disproportionately by Indigenous Australians, including 
members of the Stolen Generations. 
48  See Part IV(C) below. 
49 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 663 (Lord Bingham). 
50 Abbott v Sullivan [1952] 1 All ER 226, 231. 
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power. These citizens were frequently justices of the peace and sewer 
commissioners, both of whom performed a range of administrative functions at 
the time, respectively issuing licences and making decisions relating to 
drainage.51 The High Court has pointed out on several occasions that questions of 
validity can still be addressed in tortious actions and not only through judicial 
review.52 
Seventeenth century England is often cited as the birthplace of modern 
judicial review.53 In that context, the conferral of power on justices of the peace 
and sewer commissioners resulted in a proliferation of official conduct that was 
capable of affecting the rights and interests of the population.54 By the 19th 
century, more formal delegations of power were being made to decision-makers 
whose specific expertise left them better equipped than the legislative drafters to 
exercise discretion appropriate to certain circumstances.55 To the extent that the 
exercise of these administrative functions caused injury to a citizen, the only real 
avenue for recourse was to commence a claim in tort, seeking damages for the 
harm occasioned. The legality of the official’s conduct would be relevant to the 
assessment of liability. Access to damages was often not the outcome that a 
citizen was most interested in. Rather, proceedings in tort were in many 
circumstances commenced for the purpose of testing the validity of the 
underlying administrative action.56 For example, in Fawcett v Fowlis,57 the 
plaintiff brought proceedings in trespass against two magistrates who had 
convicted the plaintiff of failure to contribute to the upkeep of roads. The real 
purpose of the proceedings was ‘to try the question of liability’,58 being to test 
the validity of the underlying contribution order and conviction, rather than to 
seek damages for trespass. 
Public law remedies were subsequently developed and adapted, providing a 
more direct means of challenging the legality of government conduct. From these 
fused origins, subsequent developments represent an ideological retraction in the 
shape of this remedial regime, as the doctrinal approaches of judicial review and 
tort have diverged. Judicial review has become the primary means of testing the 
                                                            
51 Peter Cane, Leighton McDonald and Kristen Rundle, Principles of Administrative Law (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2018) 83. 
52 See Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501, 558 
(Gummow J); Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 
CLR 135, 143–4 [17] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 
229 CLR 638, 648 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Heydon and Crennan JJ); A v New South Wales 
(2007) 230 CLR 500, 532 [94] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
53 Amnon Rubinstein, ‘On the Origins of Judicial Review’ (1964) 2 University of British Columbia Law 
Review 1, 1–2. 
54 Edith G Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law: Certiorari and Mandamus in the 
Seventeenth Century (Harvard University Press, 1963) 2.  
55 H W Arthurs, ‘Without the Law’: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century 
England (University of Toronto Press, 1985) 136–7; Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities, above n 3, 
25. 
56 Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Oxford University Press, 1965) 53 
and see especially n 1. This kind of tort proceeding abated ‘with the proliferation of “no certiorari” 
clauses’: Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 29 [2.20]. 
57  (1827) 7 B & C 394; 108 ER 770. 
58  Ibid 771 (Lord Tenterden CJ). 
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validity of administrative action, with the tortious liability of government playing 
the role of securing compensation. This divergence is also evident in the 
comparative expansion of judicial review (the increasing popularity of privative 
and no-invalidity clauses notwithstanding)59 and retraction of tortious liability of 
government throughout the past 50 years.60 One question that may be raised by 
this development is whether, by turning to the more targeted public law 
remedies, we may have abandoned a remedy that played an effective role in 
curtailing public abuses of power.61 
 
B   Equality and Risk 
Two further foundations on which the case for developing a monetary 
remedy in the context of public law might be made are the notions of equality 
and risk. In essence, these two rationales reflect the idea that a person ought not 
to be left to bear the unequal distribution of public burdens or outcomes of 
dangerous or high-risk public services.62 The French system of administrative 
law is a useful example of the practical application of these ideas, although 
French institutional arrangements are in distinct contrast to those in Australia. 
This is primarily because France observes a strict division between the ordinary 
courts and the administrative law courts, with the latter forming part of the 
executive branch of government.63 All matters involving questions of public law 
legality (le contentieux de l’annulation) and liability (le contentieux de pleine 
juridiction) fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative law 
courts.64 
The contrast between the French administrative courts’ plenary jurisdiction 
and the Australian judicial system is of particular interest for discussions about 
public law damages. The French plenary jurisdiction encompasses traditional 
categories of fault-based liability, such as tortious liability.65 However, the notion 
of ‘fault’ in French administrative law encompasses illegality per se, with the 
effect that ‘mere illegality is in itself a fault capable of giving rise to liability 
                                                            
59  Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, ch 18. 
60  David Andrew Ipp et al, ‘Review of the Law of Negligence’ (Final Report, September 2002) ch 10; Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 5. 
61 See, eg, Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938; 92 ER 126. 
62 See, eg, Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan and Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown (Carswell, 4th ed, 
2011) 214, and in particular n 303. 
63 For a detailed overview of the French system of administrative law, see L Neville Brown and John S 
Bell, French Administrative Law (Clarendon Press, 5th ed, 1998) ch 2. 
64  Ibid 130, 180–2, citing Blanco, Tribunal des Conflits, decision no 00012, 8 February 1873 reported in Rec 
Lebon 61 and Terrier, Conseil d'État [French Administrative Court], 6 February 1903. The administrative 
courts have two further areas of jurisdiction: le contentieux de l’interpretátion, which involves 
proceedings in which the administrative courts are asked to interpret an administrative decision, and le 
contentiuex de la répression, which involves proceedings commenced by the administration against 
citizens for particular defined crimes. 
65  Ibid 183–5. Note that if the fault is a personal fault of a public official, it will fall to be adjudicated by the 
ordinary courts: at 186. 
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without more’,66 a correlation that has been described as a ‘cornerstone’ of 
French administrative law.67  
Even more revolutionary, to Australian thinking, is the fact that the French 
plenary jurisdiction has expanded beyond the notion of fault (taken to include 
illegality) to allow indemnity on the basis of risk or equality before public 
burdens (égalité devant les charges publiques).68 The rationale underpinning this 
approach is that even lawful administration in the public interest may impose an 
unfair burden on an individual that ought to be made the subject of 
compensation.69 Thus, for example, where a port authority lawfully decides not 
to remove a blockade, a ship owner who suffers loss because it cannot move into 
port may potentially recover compensation.70 Similarly, a company that is forced 
to discontinue sale of its products following the introduction of a valid law might 
be entitled to compensation for this loss of trade.71 In such cases, the French 
administrative courts may provide a remedy72 irrespective of the legality of the 
government decision or policy; the foundation of liability is to prevent an 
individual shouldering that burden alone. There are limits to the reach of the 
principle, including in connection with the nature of the burden imposed and the 
loss incurred (which must be regarded as abnormal or special).73 
Of course, before we could consider adopting such a rationale as a 
justification for the expansion of government liability in Australia, it would be 
necessary to grapple with the significant differences in institutional arrangements 
between these two countries. As noted above, the French administrative courts 
strictly form part of the executive branch of government for the purpose of 
conceiving the separation of powers,74 in respect of which we might draw a 
comparison with the Australian tribunal system. Aside from the usual caveats 
about ‘legal transplants’,75 particular caution is always wise when borrowing 
                                                            
66  Ibid 190. 
67 Fairgrieve, above n 25, 28. 
68 Brown and Bell, above n 63, 193–4; ibid 137. 
69 Brown and Bell, above n 63, 194. 
70 Sealink UK Ltd (CE 22 June 1984), cited in ibid 198. For a case involving similar facts in which the 
contrary view was reached, see Jokelson et Handstaem (CE 22 June 1984). 
71 La Fleurette, Conseil d’État [French Administrative Court], 14 January 1938 reported in [1938] Rec 
Lebon 25, cited in Brown and Bell, above n 63, 199. 
72 For discussion of the French administrative courts’ approach to compensation, see, eg, Marie-Aimee 
Latournerie, ‘The Law of France’ in John Bell and Anthony W Bradley (eds), Government Liability: A 
Comparative Study (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, 1991) 200, 219–22. 
73 Fairgrieve, above n 25, 148–9. 
74 This fact was the root of Dicey’s infamous antipathy to the French and, by extension, to the very idea of 
‘administrative law’ as an affront to the British constitution: A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 336–8. His preference for the Executive being held 
accountable in the ‘ordinary courts’ of England was the result: ibid 187–96. However, the popular view 
that Dicey did not understand French law is inaccurate; see A V Dicey, ‘Droit Administratif in Modern 
French Law’ (1901) 17 Law Quarterly Review 302; Carol Harlow, ‘The Influence of Léon Duguit on 
Anglo-American Legal Thought’ in Fabrice Melleray (ed), Autour de Léon Duguit (Bruylant, 2011) 227, 
231–2; cf H W Arthurs, ‘Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business’ (1979) 17 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 1, 6–7. 
75 See, eg, Carol Harlow, State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2004) 43. 
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from the French approach to government liability as a source of inspiration for 
the purpose of fashioning an Australian judicial remedy. 
 
C   Damages as a Tool of Accountability 
A further possible argument in favour of providing a remedy in damages for 
public law wrongs is that such an approach is consistent with the concept of 
accountability. As we have each argued elsewhere, the concept of accountability 
can be understood as a core value underpinning our system of public law.76 
While it is a concept that resists clear definition, there is support for the view that 
accountability is tied to the concept of legitimacy.77 On that view, we are more 
likely to view our system of government as legitimate if the government is held 
accountable for the way in which it exercises its powers. In a concrete sense, this 
accountability may be provided by mechanisms within our system of government 
that facilitate transparency (ie, opening up internal government processes for 
public scrutiny), control (ie, bringing a misdirected exercise of power back 
within legal boundaries), punishment (ie, punishing abuses of power) and 
restoration (ie, restoring interests that have been harmed as a result of 
misdirected exercises of public power).78  
If we accept that accountability is enhanced through the pursuit of objectives 
such as these, it follows that we should wonder how best to achieve them. This 
article does not propose to enter into the much more difficult normative debate 
regarding when these various objectives ought to be engaged.79 Nor does it argue, 
even accepting the value of these objectives, that judicial proceedings are 
necessarily the best vehicle through which they might be pursued.80 Rather, this 
                                                            
76 Ellen Rock, ‘Accountability: A Core Public Law Value?’ (2017) 24 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law 189; Janina Boughey and Greg Weeks, ‘Government Accountability as a “Constitutional Value”’ in 
Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 99.  
77  See, eg, Frederick M Barnard, Democratic Legitimacy: Plural Values and Political Power 
(McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) xi; Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans and Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Does 
Public Accountability Work? An Assessment Tool’ (2008) 86 Public Administration 225, 239; Mark 
Bovens, Deirdre Curtin and Paul ‘t Hart (eds), The Real World of EU Accountability: What Deficit? 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 53.  
78 Rock, ‘Accountability’, above n 76, 194; Ellen Rock, ‘Fault and Accountability in Public Law’ in Mark 
Elliott, Jason N E Varuhas and Shona Wilson Stark (eds), The Unity of Public Law? – Doctrinal, 
Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2018) 171, 173–4. 
79 For example, if we accept that accountability demands punishment, it is a significant leap to say that 
every type of transgression by government warrants punishment in that form. For example, we doubt 
whether accountability would demand punishment in cases where procedural rules have been 
unknowingly breached, regardless of the fact that such breach results in invalidity for administrative law 
purposes. The task of deciding when the various objectives of accountability ought to be engaged in a 
normative sense is a much larger question than that tackled here. 
80 For instance, before seriously considering whether accountability demands the expansion of the public 
law remedial regime, one might think about whether existing judicial mechanisms (eg, liability in tort or 
criminal law) or non-judicial mechanisms (eg, professional disciplinary proceedings or ex gratia 
compensation) adequately serve these objectives. Even assuming that they do not, it would be necessary 
to consider whether a new remedy is most appropriately administered by the courts, or whether it might 
be better suited to another agency (such as a tribunal or ombudsman etc). A further question not 
considered in this article is whether the expansion of remedies might potentially contribute to 
‘accountability overload’, a phenomenon in which the culmination of multiple accountability 
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article takes as its premise the more general proposition that the provision of a 
monetary award might contribute to the achievement of these objectives. Most 
clearly, the provision of compensation is capable of serving the objective of 
restoration. However, we can also view this remedy as serving a punitive 
function (as can be seen in the context of punitive damages awards) and to 
reinforce the control objective by confirming the legal boundaries within which 
power is to be exercised in future.81 Accordingly, a damages award has a number 
of features that are closely aligned with these objectives of accountability. 
We are certainly not the first to draw a connection between compensation 
and government accountability. In the aftermath of the High Court’s decision in 
Mengel,82 a number of articles were published in Australian journals, each of 
them using the tort of misfeasance in public office as a jumping off point to 
discuss compensatory damages for invalidity.83 In one such article, Panetta 
suggested that: ‘the introduction of damages as a remedy for merely wrongful 
administrative decisions causing loss to a plaintiff would represent a natural step 
in [the] gradual progression towards increasing governmental accountability’.84 
Cane also referred to the concept of accountability in his exploration of 
public law damages, suggesting that the ‘fundamental tenet’ which stands against 
the availability of damages for public law wrongs ‘is no more than a dogmatic 
assertion which bars consideration of important questions about the relationship 
between government and its citizens and about the accountability of 
government’.85 Without overstating matters, we can say that the concept of 
accountability provides a basis upon which the idea of expanding government 
liability for maladministration might be justified. 
Irrespective of the normative foundation of our case, however, it is critical to 
explore how we might realise these goals. The balance of this article outlines the 
range of judicial developments that have been ruled out by the courts, leading to 
the ultimate conclusion that the only possible way forward from this point will be 
via legislative intervention. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
mechanisms leads to negative outcomes, such as discouraging innovation, confused or inconsistent 
performance and the like: see Arie Halachmi, ‘Accountability Overloads’ in Mark Bovens, Robert E 
Goodin and Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 560. 
81 As to the declaratory function of damages in the context of public law wrongs, see, eg, Jason N E 
Varuhas, ‘The Development of the Damages Remedy under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: 
From Torts to Administrative Law’ [2016] (1) New Zealand Law Review 213, 238–9. 
82 (1995) 185 CLR 307. 
83 See, eg, Lachlan Roots, ‘Damages for Wrongful Administrative Action: A Future Remedy Needed Now’ 
(1995) 2 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 129; Geoffrey McCarthy, ‘Mengel: A Limited 
Remedy in Damages for Wrongful Administrative Action’ (1996) 4 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law 5; Rossana Panetta, ‘Damages for Wrongful Administrative Decisions’ (1999) 6 Australian Journal 
of Administrative Law 163. 
84  Panetta, above n 83, 179. 
85 Peter Cane, ‘Damages in Public Law’ (1999) 9 Otago Law Review 489, 516. 
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IV   PUBLIC LAW DAMAGES JUDICIALLY REJECTED 
Lord Bingham’s statement that all ‘wrongs should be remedied’86 has been 
well-received, although not universally so. In an extra-curial speech, Lord 
Hoffmann said: 
I yield to no one in my admiration for Lord Bingham, but I am bound to say that 
[Lord Bingham’s dictum] is as question-begging a statement as you could find. By 
what procedure should they be remedied; what should the remedy be; at whose 
expense should they be remedied? Should the law provide that every wrong 
should be remedied from the public purse? Because we are lawyers, does that 
mean that an action for damages is obviously the only right way of remedying a 
wrong?87 
His Lordship has not been alone in expressing such doubts. Australian courts 
have been presented with a range of opportunities over the past half century to 
develop a remedy providing for restoration of harm arising out of administrative 
illegality. None of these opportunities has been taken up, with the courts 
expressing reluctance to take on the task of finding the appropriate ‘peg’ within 
either public or private law upon which to hang the remedy. We can point to 
several examples. 
First, the High Court developed, but soon disapproved and ultimately put an 
end88 to the (much maligned) Beaudesert tort,89 which might have provided a 
remedy for harm caused by invalid administrative activity but was instead the 
cause of immense judicial disquiet. Secondly, the courts have maintained a strict 
hold on the mental elements of the tort of misfeasance in public office, refusing 
to expand the reach of the tort beyond cases of intentional (or subjectively 
reckless) excess of power. Thirdly, the courts have adopted an extremely strict 
approach to the task of interpreting whether the legislature intended to provide a 
civil remedy for the purpose of the tort of breach of statutory duty. Fourthly, the 
Australian judiciary has refused to follow the lead of other common law 
countries in providing a remedy for damages based on breach of constitutional 
norms. Finally, the courts have refused the invitation to interpret a broad 
remedial power in judicial review legislation as incorporating the power to award 
damages. Under Australian law, the status quo is well reflected in Einfeld J’s 
statement in Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and 
Ethnic Affairs, that ‘the mere invalidation of an administrative decision does not 
provide a cause of action or a basis for an award of damages’.90 All of this 
signals, in no uncertain terms, that any development of a monetary remedy for 
public law wrongs must at least commence through legislative, rather than 
judicial, intervention.  
 
                                                            
86  X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 663. 
87 Lord Hoffmann, ‘Reforming the Law of Public Authority Negligence’ (Speech delivered at the Bar 
Council Law Reform Lecture, London, UK, 17 November 2009) [20]. 
88 Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307. 
89 Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145 (‘Beaudesert’). 
90 (1991) 31 FCR 29, 41. 
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A   Beaudesert: A Tort Providing Compensation for Loss Caused by 
Invalidity Per Se 
As outlined in our definition of the Type 4 remedial mechanism in Part II 
above, the validity of an administrative act is generally irrelevant to tort law 
liability;91 in the words of Lord Goff, ‘there is no general right to indemnity by 
reason of damage suffered through invalid administrative action’.92 Sometimes 
the absence of legal justification for an act will be a necessary element in making 
out a tort claim,93 but the fact that an act or decision is invalid in the public law 
sense is never sufficient per se to ground liability in tort. This has long been the 
orthodox position. One possible way of extending the capacity to obtain 
monetary remedies from public authorities would be to make invalidity itself a 
compensable wrong. The High Court in Beaudesert contemplated the possibility 
of developing such a freestanding tort,94 which would provide: 
independently of trespass, negligence or nuisance but by an action for damages 
upon the case, [that] a person who suffers harm or loss as the inevitable 
consequence of the unlawful, intentional and positive acts of another is entitled to 
recover damages from that other.95 
The two critical elements of this ‘embryonic’ tort96 would have been first, 
that the wrongdoer must have acted ‘unlawfully’, ‘intentionally’ and ‘positively’, 
and secondly, that the plaintiff must have suffered loss as an ‘inevitable 
consequence’ of that conduct. The aspect of this tort that proved the most vexing 
was the question of what was meant by ‘unlawful’. Was the Court referring to 
‘an act forbidden by law or, simply, an unauthorised act in the sense of an act 
that is ultra vires and void’?97 The High Court in Mengel preferred the narrower 
reading, with the effect that there could be no liability without an act forbidden 
by law (as opposed to one which is merely invalid).98 
While some may have been justifiably ‘greatly encouraged’ by Beaudesert 
because the High Court had enunciated a ‘general principle of liability for invalid 
                                                            
91 Brennan CJ suggested that a public authority’s liability for either negligence or breach of statutory duty 
might require that the plaintiff prove that the public authority had acted ultra vires, perhaps for 
unreasonableness in the sense described in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223; Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 344–7; Romeo v 
Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431, 443–4. His Honour’s dicta 
built upon English precedent in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004, 1068 (Lord 
Diplock) and Stovin [1996] AC 923, 953 (Lord Hoffmann), but has not commanded broad support in 
Australia: see Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 1125 [19.340]; Greg Weeks, ‘A Marriage of 
Strangers: The Wednesbury Standard in Tort Law’ [2010] (8) Macquarie Journal of Business Law 131, 
135–40. 
92 R v Secretary of State for Transport; Ex parte Factortame Ltd [No 2] [1991] 1 AC 603, 672. 
93  Such as for false imprisonment: see R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 
AC 245. 
94  The tort described by the Court in Beaudesert has been referred to as an ‘innominate tort’: see Dunlop v 
Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158, 170. 
95  Beaudesert (1966) 120 CLR 145, 156. 
96  Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 343 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
97  Ibid 336 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
98  Ibid. 
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administrative action’,99 the general reception was ‘icy’.100 Academic criticism 
was almost immediate;101 the first judicial revisions came shortly after;102 and 
less than a decade after that, the Privy Council first cast fairly emphatic doubt on 
the Beaudesert principle103 before rejecting it altogether four months later.104 It 
was, then, wholly unsurprising when the High Court in Mengel overturned 
Beaudesert less than three decades after it had first been decided; the only 
surprise was that it had taken so long at all. As Barton remarked almost a decade 
before Beaudesert was finally terminated:  
Those cases that have considered Beaudesert have stripped it of any real impact. 
As a result of twenty years explaining and distinguishing Beaudesert now stands 
for little more than an example of the distinction between an action in trespass and 
an action upon the case.105 
While we share Barton’s view that Beaudesert served as a catalyst for 
‘discussions and debates’ which assist in defining the principles at stake ‘with 
greater clarity’,106 the fact remains that, three decades after he expressed that 
view, the judiciary is virtually silent in contributing to discussion of this legal 
principle.107 The distaste that Beaudesert provoked almost immediately after it 
was decided has not dissipated over time. 
 
B   Misfeasance in Public Office: Reducing the Fault Burden 
Modification of the tort of misfeasance in public office is a further possible 
means by which damages might be made available in a wider array of cases 
involving ultra vires conduct. In Mengel, Deane J concisely summed up the 
elements of the tort as follows: ‘(i) an invalid or unauthorised act; (ii) done 
                                                            
99  G P Barton, ‘Damages in Administrative Law’ in Michael Taggart (ed), Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 1986) 123, 131. 
100  Ibid 132. Harlow said with some understatement that ‘the case is not beloved of the judiciary’: Carol 
Harlow, Compensation and Government Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 1982) 67. 
101  Gerald Dworkin and Abraham Harari, ‘The Beaudesert Decision – Raising the Ghost of the Action upon 
the Case: Part I’ (1967) 40 Australian Law Journal 296; Gerald Dworkin and Abraham Harari, ‘The 
Beaudesert Decision – Raising the Ghost of the Action upon the Case: Part II’ (1967) 40 Australian Law 
Journal 347. 
102  ‘It seems to me that for the plaintiff to succeed in his special action on the case he must show something 
more than a mere breach of the statute and consequential damage; he must show something over and 
above what would ground liability for breach of statutory duty if the action were available. As I see the 
case, he has not succeeded in showing that the act was tortious (and not merely a contravention of the 
statute), that its inevitable consequence was to cause damage to the plaintiff, or that there was an 
intention to cause harm to the plaintiff’: Kitano v Commonwealth (1974) 129 CLR 151, 174–5 (Mason J). 
103  Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158, 170–1 (Privy Council). 
104  Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [No 2] [1982] AC 173.  
105  Barton, above n 99, 135. 
106  Ibid. 
107  Hayne J referred to Beaudesert as a ‘temporary diversion’ in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 
306 [347]. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ referred briefly to the reasons for which Mengel 
had overturned Beaudesert in Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329, 343–4 [35]. Leaving aside these 
exceptions, no Australian court has mentioned Beaudesert since the High Court’s decision in Mengel 
(and it was not mentioned frequently before Mengel either). 
1176 UNSW Law Journal Volume 41(4) 
 
maliciously; (iii) by a public officer; (iv) in the purported discharge of his or her 
public duties; (v) which causes loss or harm to the plaintiff’.108  
The mental element of the tort has been described as comprising two 
alternative limbs.109 The first is that of ‘targeted malice’, which captures ‘actual 
intention to cause injury’,110 or conduct either ‘specifically intended to injure a 
person’111 or engaged in ‘with the predominant intent of damaging a person’.112 
The second limb, which addresses a knowing or recklessly unlawful act that 
causes damage, captures both deliberate wrongdoing and recklessness in the 
sense of ‘deliberate blindness’.113  
Until recently, there had been some doubt as to whether an official was only 
liable for damage that they actually foresaw, or whether liability also extended to 
damage that an official ought to have foreseen.114 In Obeid v Lockley, the NSW 
Court of Appeal was firmly of the view that the misfeasance tort requires a 
plaintiff to establish that the defendant was aware their conduct would cause 
harm, or were recklessly indifferent to such a risk.115 This insistence on proof of 
subjective awareness of harm prevents the tort from expanding to capture an 
official who recklessly exceeds their powers in circumstances where they ought 
to have foreseen the possibility of harm arising. 
Because the tort of misfeasance in public office contemplates damages for 
ultra vires conduct, it is unsurprising that it has proved a beacon for academic 
consideration of compensatory damages as a remedy for ‘wrongful’ 
administrative action or maladministration.116 However, the courts have shown 
little inclination to lower the grade of the mental element beyond the strict bar set 
in Mengel, both in relation to awareness of illegality and awareness of harm. The 
degree of ‘conscious maladministration’117 required to make out a claim of 
misfeasance (and satisfy the accompanying evidentiary burden) means that this 
tort is likely to continue to play only a residual role in providing compensation 
for public law wrongs. 
                                                            
108  Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 370. Aronson noted that Deane J’s summary of the tort (at 370–1) came 
closest to an explicit affirmation of the usually implicit view that ‘the alternative mental elements 
(targeted malice, knowledge and conscious indifference) comprise a closed list of the types of fault 
sufficient to warrant an action for misfeasance’: Mark Aronson, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very 
Peculiar Tort’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 22. 
109  Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [No 3] [2003] 2 AC 1, 137 (Auld LJ). In the House of 
Lords, both Lord Hobhouse (at 230) and Lord Millett (at 235) viewed the mental elements suggested by 
Deane J merely as examples ‘of the types of dishonesty or want of good faith that the tort requires’: 
Aronson, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort’ above n 108. 
110  Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 370 (Deane J). 
111  Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [No 3] [2003] 2 AC 1, 191 (Lord Steyn). 
112  Ibid 137 (Auld LJ). 
113  Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 371 (Deane J).  
114  See, eg, South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331, 387–8 [263] (The Court); 
Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 1151–2 [19.650]; Alison Doecke, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office: 
Foreseen or Foreseeable Harm’ (2014) 22 Torts Law Journal 20. 
115  (2018) 355 ALR 615, 648–53 [153]–[172] (Bathurst CJ), 665–7 [242] (Leeming JA). 
116  See above n 83. 
117  Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 375 [124] (Gummow J); Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146, 153–4 [11]–[15], 157 [25] (Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
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C   The Tort of Breach of Statutory Duty 
A third tort that may have opened the path towards a general remedy in 
damages for excess of public power is the tort of breach of statutory duty. As a 
matter of historical interest: ‘the common law was once willing to adopt the 
simple principle that the breach of a duty created by a statute, if it results in 
damage to an individual, is a tort for which an action for damages will lie at his 
suit …’118 
On that approach, the government would be liable for any loss occasioned 
through the misdirected exercise of a duty set out in legislation. However, 
Harlow described breach of statutory duty as a ‘missing tort’ because the scope 
of liability for harm caused by such breaches had, even by 1982, become so 
hedged about with qualifications that the tort was of little meaningful value for 
the purpose of obtaining a remedy for the misdirected exercise of public 
power.119 The matter can be phrased in the opposite way, by stating that breach 
of statutory duty has been ‘starved of attention in negligence’s considerable 
shadow’ and ‘is a cause of action which shows little sign of life outside its 
original area of workplace safety law’.120 
The most problematic aspect of breach of statutory duty has been its focus on 
parliamentary intention,121 as the tort is relevant only where it can be said that 
parliament intended to impose liability upon a defendant122 through a private 
cause of action where a statutory duty had been breached. This may be the case, 
for instance, if the statute was designed to prevent the kind of harm suffered by 
the plaintiff,123 or could be read as imposing a duty for the benefit of a particular 
class of persons,124 as opposed to protecting the ‘general public interest’.125 In the 
context of government liability, the court may also take into account competing 
interests: 
[T]here is a need to balance the protection of liberty and due process with the need 
for public officials to carry out their obligations honestly and in good faith free 
from the fear of actions for damages, either against themselves or their employers 
who would normally be vicariously liable.126 
                                                            
118  Sir John William Salmond et al, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st ed, 
1996) 247, cited in Harlow, Compensation and Government Torts, above n 100, 68 (citing previous 
edition). 
119  Harlow, Compensation and Government Torts, above n 100, 68–70. 
120  Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 1131 [19.400]–[19.410]. In R (Canada) v Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool [1983] 1 SCR 205, the Canadian Supreme Court isolated the tort to industrial saftety legislation, 
which was widely understood as virtually killing it off. However, the more recent decision in Cooper v 
Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537 might have breathed some new life back into it. 
121  O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464, 477–8 (Dixon J); Byrne and Frew v Australian Airlines Ltd 
(1995) 185 CLR 410, 424 (Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
122  Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36. 
123  Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99. 
124  Read v Croydon Corporation [1938] 4 All ER 631. 
125  Chordas v Bryant (Wellington) Pty Ltd (1988) 20 FCR 91, 102 (The Court). 
126  Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 29, 38 
(Einfeld J). 
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Ultimately, the task of divining parliamentary intention and balancing 
competing concerns such as these has left the tort with perhaps even less of a role 
to play in the context of government liability than in general.  
It has been suggested that one way of bringing clarity to the tort would be to 
apply an interpretive presumption that a breach of statutory duty is intended (or 
not intended) to sound in damages unless the contrary intention appears.127 
Certainly the use of such a tool of interpretation would simplify matters. 
However, an added benefit of the use of a presumption in favour of liability 
would be to bolster government accountability. As with the principle of legality 
more generally, Parliament would be obliged ‘squarely [to] confront what it is 
doing and accept the political cost’.128 This argument gathers strength in the 
modern Australian context given that the way that parliamentary ‘intent’ is 
determined has shifted from a search for any actual intention on the part of 
legislators129 to the application of principles and presumptions to the ‘construct’ 
of legislative intention.130 
Whatever the merits of these views, however, the courts’ approach to 
government liability for the tort of breach of statutory duty in modern times has 
been dismissive. Further, we note that legislative intervention in this area has had 
the effect of making a claim even more difficult, in requiring a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the nature of the breach was ‘so unreasonable that no authority 
… could properly consider [it] to be a reasonable exercise of its functions’.131 In 
light of these developments, we see no prospect of the expansion of this tort so as 
to provide a remedy for invalid administrative action per se. 
 
D   A Constitutional Tort? 
A number of other common law jurisdictions, one of the most notable being 
the United States, provide a damages remedy for breaches of constitutional 
norms, a cause of action that has been described as a ‘constitutional tort’. The 
Constitution of the United States does not provide an express remedy for its 
breach.132 The so-called ‘constitutional torts’ were developed later,133 and include 
a common law right to damages for violations by federal officers, known as the 
‘Bivens action’.134 The Bivens case itself involved a claim for damages brought 
following an unauthorised search by Federal narcotics agents. The Supreme 
                                                            
127  See, eg, Harlow, Compensation and Government Torts, above n 100, 69–70; Alec Samuels, 'Is a Breach 
of Statutory Duty Actionable?' (1995) 16 Statute Law Review 225. 
128  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (Lord 
Hoffmann).  
129  See Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 339–40 (Gaudron J), 345–6 
(McHugh J). 
130  Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Litigating in a Statutory Universe’ (Speech delivered at the Victorian Bar 
Association 2nd Annual CPD Conference, Melbourne, 18 February 2012). 
131  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 43. 
132  Hogg, Monahan and Wright, above n 62, 202. 
133  The first was the statutory right to damages for violations by State officers pursuant to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871: Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 USC § 1983 (2006). 
134  Named for the landmark case in which the Supreme Court first established the principle: Bivens v Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971) (‘Bivens’). 
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Court found that a damages claim against the agents was maintainable on the 
basis of the contravention of Mr Bivens’ fourth amendment rights.135 Such a 
claim does not operate on the principle of vicarious liability,136 but is a 
proceeding directly against the individual officer who infringed the relevant 
constitutional right.137 To make out a Bivens action, the plaintiff must have been 
deprived of a right guaranteed by the Constitution by a federal officer acting 
within the scope of federal law.  
One of the main mechanisms by which the courts reject Bivens claims is if 
‘special factors’ tend against a remedy,138 a test whose application effectively 
leaves Bivens with a role to play only where Congress has not otherwise 
indicated (expressly or impliedly) its intention to deal with remedies for breaches 
of particular constitutional rights.139 The Supreme Court has since clarified that 
the scope of the enquiry is to be concentrated ‘on whether the Judiciary is well 
suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs 
and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed’.140 There will also be no 
Bivens liability if the defendant enjoys an immunity. Absolute immunity applies 
to government officers who are engaged in ‘special functions’141 and is focussed 
on the character of the power being exercised. By contrast, qualified immunity is 
concerned with the manner in which the power is exercised and immunises 
government officials if ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known’.142 In other words, there is no liability in circumstances where the content 
of the applicable constitutional right or derivative legal obligation is not well-
defined or remains open to interpretation.   
                                                            
135  A holding subsequently extended to apply to other constitutional rights, including those protected by the 
fifth and eighth amendments: Davis v Passman, 442 US 228 (1979) and Carlson v Green, 446 US 14 
(1980), cited in Alexander A Reinert, ‘Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences 
for the Individual Liability Model’ (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 809, 822. However, these are the only 
cases since Bivens in which the Supreme Court has awarded non-statutory tortious damages. See Hogg, 
Monahan and Wright, above n 62, 201–2; Jason N E Varuhas, Damages and Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing, 2016) 468. 
136  Although in many circumstances individual officers are indemnified by their government employer; see, 
eg, Barbara E Armacost, ‘Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 
583, 665. 
137  As opposed to the government at large, with the exception that the statutory cause of action against state 
officers extends also to municipalities: Reinert, above n 135, 811 and text accompanying n 6. 
138  In Bivens itself, the Court made only the rather cursory statement that there were ‘no special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress’ but did not go into detail about 
what this meant: Bivens 403 US 388, 396 (1971). A small number of cases were later cited as examples 
of circumstances that presumably involved ‘special factors’, eg, United States v Standard Oil Company of 
California, 332 US 301 (1947) and United States v Gilman, 347 US 507 (1954). 
139  Anya Bernstein, ‘Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special 
about Special Factors?’ (2011) 45 Indiana Law Review 719, 720–1. 
140  Ziglar v Abbasi (S Ct, No 15-1538, 19 June 2017) slip op 12–13.  
141  Including the activities of legislators, judges, prosecutors and the President: Janell M Byrd, ‘Rejecting 
Absolute Immunity for Federal Officials’ (1983) 71 California Law Review 1707, 1714–15. 
142  Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982), cited in Armacost, above n 136, 619. As reflected in the 
wording ‘would have known’, the test is applied objectively rather than subjectively and invites an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the official’s conduct. 
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Despite early excitement regarding the game-changing role that Bivens 
actions could play in relation to constitutional violations, many now consider the 
cause of action to be somewhat of a dead letter in the United States.143 In 
Australia, which has no specifically public torts other than misfeasance in public 
office, the High Court has resoundingly rejected arguments that a remedy in the 
style of that applied in Bivens ought to be made available for conduct in breach 
of the Australian Constitution.144 There are two reasons why we should not be 
surprised by this. First, much of the focus of the Australian High Court has in 
recent decades centred on the so-called ‘constitutional writs’.145 To ask the Court 
to develop a remedy in damages for breach of the Constitution would require the 
Court to look beyond the scope and purpose of the named writs and this would 
be at odds with recent jurisprudence. Secondly, the Australian Constitution 
includes few express rights146 and protects them in a conditional fashion.147 
Countries like Canada and New Zealand, which protect individual rights either 
explicitly or implicitly through constitutional rights instruments,148 have a greater 
capacity to follow the trail blazed in Bivens.149 
In James v Commonwealth,150 the High Court considered a claim for 
damages based on the argument that section 92 of the Constitution conferred 
some form of rights on the plaintiff to trade without impediment, and that the 
enactment of legislation which fell afoul of section 92 breached that right. In 
rejecting this argument, Dixon J stated: 
Prima facie a constitution is concerned with the powers and functions of 
government and the restraints upon their exercise. There is, in my opinion, no 
sufficient reason to regard sec 92 as including among its purposes the creation of 
private rights sounding in damages …151 
The argument was raised again in Kruger v Commonwealth,152 where the 
plaintiffs sought damages relating to the removal and detention of Indigenous 
                                                            
143  In Correctional Services Corp v Malesko, 534 US 61, 75 (2001), Scalia J described the Bivens action as a 
‘relic of … heady days’. But Reinert argues that on closer examination, the success rate of Bivens actions 
is in the order of 16 per cent to more than 40 per cent: Reinert, above n 135, 813. 
144  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563 (The Court); Kruger v 
Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 46–7 (Brennan CJ), 93 (Toohey J), 125–6 (Gaudron J) and 146–8 
(Gummow J); British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30, 52–3 
(McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 
181, 245 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Aid/Watch Inc v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (2010) 241 CLR 539, 556 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). Only Kirby J 
has expressed a preference for Australia following the approach taken in the USA and New Zealand: 
British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30, 79. 
145  Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 92–3 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 
146  Such ‘rights’ as the Australian Constitution does contain are better characterised as negative limits on 
legislative and executive power, rather than as rights to be enjoyed by the individual. 
147  See James Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 553–4. 
148  See Hogg, Monahan and Wright, above n 62, 202–3. 
149  In the celebrated Canadian case of Vancouver (City) v Ward [2010] 2 SCR 28, the plaintiff was able to 
obtain damages for breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in circumstances where 
police had subjected him to a strip search on suspicion that he intended to throw a pie at the Prime 
Minister. 
150  (1939) 62 CLR 339. 
151  Ibid 362. 
152  (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
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children pursuant to legislation which was argued to be invalid on a number of 
bases, including that the legislation was contrary to various provisions of the 
Constitution. Though the High Court dismissed the claim of invalidity, several of 
the judgments referred to the issue of whether contravention of the Constitution 
would have afforded a right to damages in any event. Brennan CJ put the 
position as follows: 
The Constitution creates no private rights enforceable directly by an action for 
damages … The Constitution reveals no intention to create a private right of 
action for damages for an attempt to exceed the powers it confers or to ignore the 
restraints it imposes … If a government does or omits to do anything which, under 
the general law, would expose it or its servants or agents to a liability in damages, 
an attempt to deny or to escape that liability fails when justification for the act 
done or omission made depends on a statute or an action that is invalid for want of 
constitutional support. In such a case, liability is not incurred for breach of a 
constitutional right but by operation of the general law. But if a government does 
or omits to do something the doing or omission of which attracts no liability under 
the general law, no liability in damages for doing or omitting to do that thing is 
imposed on the government by the Constitution.153 
In other words, the exercise of legislative power in excess of constitutional 
limits is not, of itself, a wrong that sounds in damages, though an invalid law 
cannot immunise conduct which would otherwise be wrongful within the 
meaning of the general law. 
 
E   Interpretation of the Power to Make Orders Pursuant to Section 16 of 
the ADJR Act 
The question of whether damages might be available as a remedy for invalid 
administrative action has arisen under section 16(1)(d) of the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’). The ADJR Act has 
been described as ‘overwhelmingly beneficial’154 and as featuring a ‘flexible and 
expanded remedial framework’.155 The drafters’ intention in this regard is evident 
on the Act’s face. However, the broadly drafted text of section 16 disguises the 
fact that the ADJR Act’s remedial mechanisms have been construed narrowly, 
and conformably with common law judicial review principles,156 by courts for 
most of the Act’s history.  
This point can be made by reference to section 16(1)(a). At common law, the 
ordinary position is that a decision affected by jurisdictional error is treated as 
invalid from the date of the decision itself.157 In contrast, section 16(1)(a) of the 
ADJR Act provides a court with the discretion to make: ‘an order quashing or 
                                                            
153  Ibid 46. 
154  Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59, 94 
[157] (Kirby J).  
155  Administrative Review Council, above n 2, 76 [4.19]. The areas in which section 16 exceeds the 
‘amplitude of [the remedial] … power’ held by general law courts are set out in Robin Creyke, John 
McMillan and Mark Smyth, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 4th ed, 2015) 1121–2 [17.8.2]. 
156  Sometimes this is for the simple reason that the ADJR Act cannot ‘transform the judicial review role of a 
court’: Creyke, McMillan and Smyth, above n 155, 1122 [17.8.4]. 
157  Nguyen v Minister for Health and Ageing (2002) 121 FCR 89, 91 (Weinberg J). 
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setting aside the decision, or a part of the decision, with effect from the date of 
the order or from such earlier or later date as the court specifies’. 
That subsection was considered in Wattmaster Alco Pty Ltd v Button,158 in 
which Pincus J employed this power to set aside an invalid customs declaration 
from the date of the Court’s decision rather than from the earlier date of the 
declaration itself. His Honour noted the difference between the ‘apparently 
unfettered discretion’ to fix the date from which an order becomes operative 
under the ADJR Act and the substantively different situation under the general 
law,159 holding that: ‘prima facie the setting aside should be operative from the 
date of the court's decision; a party desiring the specification of a different date 
must demonstrate the propriety of that course’.160 
On appeal, Sheppard and Wilcox JJ (with whom Fox J agreed on this point) 
viewed this as problematic,161 holding that the provision was ‘intended to do no 
more than to indicate that the Court has a choice from all the available 
possibilities: the date of the order, an earlier date or a later date’.162 Furthermore, 
their Honours noted that, although unusual in a general law order, there is no 
particular difficulty with making an administrative act or decision a nullity from 
a date other than that on which the act or decision first demonstrated 
jurisdictional error.163 The court’s choice of a date should be guided only by the 
justice of the individual case, rather than any presumption as to the exercise of 
that discretion or the view that either party bears an onus to demonstrate why a 
particular date is appropriate.164 In deciding that the decision ought to be set aside 
from the date it was originally made,165 the Full Court was guided heavily by 
general law considerations, which had the practical effect of keeping the ADJR 
remedial scheme closer to that which would have been available under section 
39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).166  
A preference for a common law reading of section 16 is also evident in the 
approach taken in Jadwan.167 That case recognised that ‘retrospective 
nullification does not automatically follow from a court’s conclusion that a 
decision was jurisdictionally flawed’.168 The Full Federal Court held that a 
                                                            
158  (1986) 8 FCR 471. 
159  The common law remedial discretion also allows courts to delay their orders coming into effect: 
Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 758–60 [10.360]–[10.365]. 
160  Wattmaster Alco Pty Ltd v Button (1986) 8 FCR 471, 480. 
161  Wattmaster Alco Pty Ltd v Button (1986) 13 FCR 253, 255–6 (‘Wattmaster Alco Appeal’).  
162  Ibid 256. 
163  Ibid. See Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 731–2 [10.20]–[10.30]. 
164  If the order does not stipulate a date, it is assumed under s 16(1)(a) that the operative date is the date of 
the order itself. 
165  Wattmaster Alco Pty Ltd v Button (1986) 13 FCR 253, 259. See, however, criticism of the Full Court’s 
lack of clarity in this regard: Jadwan Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care (2003) 
145 FCR 1, 18 (Gray and Downes JJ) (‘Jadwan’). 
166  There were also some practical issues around the fact that the appellant had already paid substantial sums 
of import duty, under protest, on the authority of the invalid order: Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above 
n 3, 759–60 [10.365].  
167  (2003) 145 FCR 1. 
168  Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 740 [10.110]; approved in Lewis v Australian Capital Territory 
(2018) 329 FLR 267, 303 [202] (Refshauge J). 
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nursing home’s status as an ‘approved provider’ was able to be restored but, 
since it had never alleged the presence of a jurisdictional error or sought to have 
the cancellation of its status declared a nullity, any such restoration could be 
prospective only. The general law application of judicial review remedies 
essentially overruled a statutory regime whose whole point, successfully realised 
for ‘the first decade or so’ of its operation,169 was to operate beyond the 
limitations of jurisdictional error.170 Although the Full Court in Jadwan reached 
its conclusion for different reasons to those in Wattmaster Alco Appeal, it 
nonetheless indicated a preference for common law remedial concepts over those 
in section 16 of the ADJR Act.171  
These cases are helpful in the context of interpreting the scope of the courts’ 
remedial power under section 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act to ‘[direct] … any of the 
parties to do … any act or thing the doing … of which the court considers 
necessary to do justice between the parties’. While the High Court has said that 
the ‘scope of the powers to make orders which the subsection confers should not 
… be constricted by undue technicality’,172 this does not mean that the Court has 
been prepared to extend the scope of the ADJR Act’s remedial provisions beyond 
that of the equivalent general law remedies. At the time when the ADJR Act was 
being drafted, it was recommended to the drafter that a provision be included 
which would enable the Federal Court to develop a damages remedy. However, 
the opposition to the ADJR Act as a whole was such that a specific provision for 
damages would have had no prospect of adoption and the plan for a damages 
remedy was dropped. It may be an unforeseen consequence of this choice that the 
remedies under the ADJR Act still cleave to the common law. 
The litigation in the Park Oh Ho cases, which involved the unlawful 
detention of unlawful entrants into Australia in lieu of deportation,173 remains 
central to an understanding of the capacity of courts to award damages under this 
provision. At trial,174 Davies J held that the orders made to detain the applicants 
                                                            
169  Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of Australian Administrative Law’ 
(2010) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 96. 
170  However, there is an argument that the same reasoning will come into effect whenever an applicant seeks 
an order that the decision under challenge was not ‘made under’ the enactment in question: Jadwan 
(2003) 145 FCR 1, 17 (Gray and Downes JJ); Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 81–2 [2.410]. 
171  In Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 128, 146–7 [77], Perram, 
Yates and Mortimer JJ expressed doubt whether an unlawful decision – ‘especially where the error 
identified is of a jurisdictional kind’ –  could be set aside with effect from a future date under section 
16(1)(a) where to do so would involve a court in preserving an unlawful decision. See also Minister for 
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Conyngham (1986) 11 FCR 528; Park Oh Ho v Minister of State for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 167 CLR 637; Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 
178 CLR 408. 
172  Park Oh Ho v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 167 CLR 637, 644 (Mason CJ, 
Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
173  The applicants were held for the purpose of giving evidence in criminal proceedings relating to the 
people smuggling scheme under which they had entered the country. The statutory power to detain is 
both limited and purposive; see, eg, CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 
CLR 514, 539 (French CJ). 
174  Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 14 ALD 787. 
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in the country for an ultra vires purpose were a nullity.175 However, in contrast to 
legislation allowing public bodies to be sued for damages in tort,176 he held that 
the text of section 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act was insufficient to ground a right to 
damages, having established a ground of review under the Act.177 
On appeal to the Full Federal Court,178 Morling J thought that ‘doing justice’ 
was limited to the review of the impugned decision rather than in relation to 
associated common law claims179 and confirmed that ‘[t]he award of damages 
has never been held to be a remedy available in proceedings brought by way of 
judicial review’.180 Though the issue was not the subject of the subsequent grant 
of special leave to appeal to the High Court,181 it took the opportunity in a 
unanimous joint judgment to confirm that damages fell into a different category 
than other forms of relief, saying ‘both declaratory and injunctive orders, as 
distinct from an order for damages, can readily be seen as appropriate remedies 
of judicial “review” of administrative decisions and actions’.182 The High Court 
allowed the appeals and ordered that the orders of Davies J be varied to include a 
declaration that the appellants’ detention had been unlawful.183 
A declaration that the applicants in the Park Oh Ho cases had been invalidly 
detained was practically important because such an order paved the way to 
making out the tort of false imprisonment, which is remedied by an order for 
damages. However:  
recent judgments … have said that only nominal damages should be awarded if 
the government party can show that it would in any event have lawfully 
imprisoned the plaintiff. The reasoning is that the plaintiff has actually lost 
nothing.184 
                                                            
175  Ibid 791. However, his Honour declined to make a declaration to that effect, preferring to set the orders 
aside ab initio: at 792.  
176  See, eg, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 64. This provision removes the procedural bar to bringing suit for 
torts committed directly by the Crown, as opposed to exposure to vicarious liability for the torts of those 
it employs: Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471. Equivalent legislation exists in every 
Australian jurisdiction; see Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 1093–4 [19.70]. 
177  Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 14 ALD 787, 789–90. 
178  The three judges in the Full Federal Court would each have made different orders. Ultimately, both the 
appeals and cross appeals were dismissed, by differently comprised majorities. Each of the three 
judgments agreed, however, that damages were not available as a remedy under the ADJR Act: Park Oh 
Ho v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 104, 114 (Sweeney J), 126 (Morling J), 
134 (Foster J). 
179  Ibid 126–7 (Morling J). 
180  Ibid 126. 
181  The High Court’s grant of special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court was 
limited to Davies J’s decision to set aside the orders made to detain the applicants in the country for an 
ultra vires purpose as a nullity, rather than to make a declaration to that effect: Park Oh Ho v Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 167 CLR 637, 641–2, 644 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ).  
182  Ibid 645. Note that the use of declaratory relief was, distinct from damages, specified as an ‘appropriate’ 
remedy. 
183  Ibid 646. 
184  Aronson, Groves and Weeks, above n 3, 750 [10.220] (citation omitted). See, eg, the discussion in Lewis 
v Australian Capital Territory [2018] 329 FLR 267, 316–19 [316]–[339] (Refshauge J). 
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The fact that the applicants in Park Oh Ho were being detained for an invalid 
purpose and would otherwise have been deported should have been enough to 
overcome this concern. 
One final issue deserves mention. In Johns v Australian Securities 
Commission,185 Brennan J made the point that, when a public authority owes an 
equitable obligation and that obligation is breached, it can either be enforced by 
an injunction or remedied by damages under Lord Cairns’ Act.186 The Supreme 
Court in each Australian jurisdiction has power granted in similar terms, in 
addition to the inherent power to award equitable compensation for the breach of 
a fiduciary or other equitable duty.187 These are remedies that fill a similar need 
to damages, although to say that the power to grant equitable compensation is 
used even sporadically, would be to overstate matters. 
 
V   CONCLUSION 
Taking into account the approach to damages adopted by the courts as 
outlined above, it appears that there is no prospect of the judiciary taking on the 
task of extending the remedial approach to existing causes of action, so as to 
provide a remedy in damages consequent upon the invalid exercise of public 
power. Therefore, if we are to see the development of such a remedy at any point 
in the near future, it will be legislatively,188 rather than judicially, driven. Any 
assessment on our part of the legislative appetite for such a development would 
be merely speculative (though we note that it has been much more usual in recent 
times for legislatures to reduce public authorities’ tort liability than to increase 
it).189 Rather, we highlight these judicial misgivings as part of the more important 
task of weighing up the objections that will inevitably be made to the 
development of such a remedy more generally. 
A number of proposals for law reform have been put forward with a view to 
providing a means of restoration for individuals who have been harmed as a 
result of government maladministration. Peter Cane was an early contributor to 
the debate, urging that we release our hold on the ‘fundamental tenet’ that 
damages are not available for breaches of public law rules, and instead direct our 
attention to whether there is anything in the nature of a remedy in damages that 
renders it unsuitable to the public law context (which in his view, there was 
not).190 Others have taken the matter a step further, in advocating the adoption of 
a particular remedial framework. Notable in this respect are the proposals put 
                                                            
185  (1993) 178 CLR 408, 429. 
186  Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict c 27). 
187  Greg Weeks, ‘Estoppel and Public Authorities: Examining the Case for an Equitable Remedy’ (2010) 4 
Journal of Equity 247, 278–86. 
188  Even an executive solution at Commonwealth level would need to be supported by legislation within a 
constitutional head of power; see Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156; Williams v 
Commonwealth (2014) 252 CLR 416. 
189  See above n 60. 
190  Cane, above n 85. 
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forward by Tom Cornford191 and the UK Law Reform Commission.192 It would 
be fair to say that responses to proposals such as these have been weighted more 
heavily against reform. We think that it is high time to revisit some of the core 
concerns that have been thrown up as roadblocks to the development of a remedy 
for public law wrongs, which range from the well-rehearsed pragmatic concerns 
about overkill and drain on public funds, to more nuanced concerns about 
incoherence in the law and even breach of the separation of powers. On closer 
inspection we may find that these are not so much insuperable barriers, but 
pitfalls that may be avoided by adopting a considered approach. 
                                                            
191  Tom Cornford, Towards a Public Law of Tort (Ashgate Publishing, 2008). 
192  UK Law Commission, ‘Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen’ (Consultation Paper No 
187, 17 June 2008).  
